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1 Introduction
This paper investigates how the gender of a firm’s CEO affects the workers’ gender-
specific wage distributions and the firm’s performance using a unique matched employer-
employee panel dataset representative of the Italian manufacturing sector.
A growing literature shows that executives’ characteristics such as management
practices, style, and attitudes towards risk can have an effect on firm outcomes.1 Our
focus on gender follows from the abundant evidence of systematic gender differentials
in the labor market.2 Research has highlighted that women are almost ten times less
represented than men in top positions in firms.3 For example, recent U.S. data show
that even though women are a little more than 50% of white collar workers, they
represent only 4.6% of executives.4 Our own Italian data show that about 26% of
workers in the manufacturing sector are women compared with only 3% of executives
and 2% of CEOs. Together, these facts suggest that gender is a potentially relevant
characteristic and that women’s underrepresentation among executives may have
important productivity and welfare implications.
This paper provides four contributions to the existing literature. First, we de-
velop a theoretical model highlighting a potential channel of interaction between
female executives, female workers, wage policies, job assignment, and overall firm
performance. The model implies efficiency costs of women’s underrepresentation
in leadership positions, and generates empirical predictions that can be tested and
compared with implications from possible alternative mechanisms. Second, we in-
vestigate the empirical predictions of the model for the relationship between female
leadership and the gender-specific wage distributions at the firm level. Different
1Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) is one of the first contributions emphasizing differences in
management practices. See also a recent survey in Bloom and Van Reenen (2010). A growing
literature showing the effects of CEO characteristics follows the influential paper of Bertrand and
Schoar (2003). Among recent contributions, see Bennedsen et al. (2012), Kaplan et al. (2012), or
Lazear et al. (2012). For research on executives’ overconfidence, see Malmendier and Tate (2005).
For theoretical contributions, see for example Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Tervio (2008). For
contributions focusing on both executive and firm characteristics, see Bandiera et al. (2011) and
Lippi and Schivardi (2014).
2For an overview of the gender gap in the U.S. labor market in the last twenty years, see Blau
and Kahn (2004), Eckstein and Nagypal (2004) and Flabbi (2010).
3Evidence from U.S. firms is based on the Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp dataset, which
contains information on top executives in the S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400, and S&P SmallCap 600.
See for example, Bertrand and Hallock (2001), Wolfers (2006), Gayle et al. (2012), Dezsö and Ross
(2012). The literature on other countries is extremely thin: see Cardoso and Winter-Ebmer (2010)
(Portugal), Ahern and Dittmar (2012) and Matsa and Miller (2013) (Norway), Smith et al. (2006)
(Denmark). A related literature is concerned with under-representation of women at the top of the
wage distribution, see for example Albrecht et al. (2003). Both phenomena are often referred to as
a glass-ceiling preventing women from reaching top positions in the labor market.
4Our elaboration on 2012 Current Population Survey and ExecuComp data.
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from previous literature, and consistent with our model, the main focus is not on
the effects on average wages, but on differential impacts over the wage distribution.
This is important because different theoretical mechanisms have different predic-
tions for what the effects of female leadership should be at different parts of the
wage distribution. Third, we investigate the empirical predictions of the model on
the relationship between female leadership and firm performance. Unlike previous
literature, which focused generally on measures of financial performance, we focus
on indicators that are less volatile and less likely to be affected by gender discrimina-
tion: sales per worker, value added per worker and Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
(Wolfers, 2006). Finally, we perform a series of partial equilibrium counterfactual
exercises to compute the cost of women’s underrepresentation in top positions in
organizations.
In Section 2 we present our theoretical model and derive its empirical implica-
tions. Our model extends the seminal statistical discrimination model of Phelps
(1972) to include two types of jobs, one requiring complex tasks and the other sim-
ple tasks, and two types of CEOs, male and female. Based on a noisy productivity
signal and the worker’s gender, CEOs assign workers to jobs and wages. We assume
that CEOs are better (more accurate) at reading signals from workers of their own
gender.5 We also assume that complex tasks require more skills to be completed
successfully, and that there is a comparative advantage to employ higher human
capital workers in complex tasks. After defining the equilibrium generated by this
environment, we focus on the empirical implications of a female CEO taking charge
of a male CEO-run firm. Thanks to the more precise signal they receive from female
workers, female CEOs reverse statistical discrimination against women, adjusting
their wages and reducing the mismatch between female workers’ productivity and
job requirements. The model delivers two sharp, testable empirical implications:
1. Females at the top of the wage distribution receive higher wages when employed
by a female CEO than when employed by a male CEO. Females at the bottom
of the wage distribution receive lower wages when employed by a female CEO.
The impact of female CEOs on the male distribution has the opposite signs:
negative at the top and positive at the bottom of the distribution.
2. The performance of a firm led by a female CEO increases with the share of
female workers.
These results follow from the assumption that female CEOs are better at processing
information about female workers’ productivity. Therefore, wages of females em-
5We discuss this assumption in Subsection 2.3.
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ployed by female CEOs are more sensitive to individual productivity, delivering the
first implication. Moreover, female CEOs improve the allocation of female workers
across tasks, delivering the second implication.
Our data, described in detail in Section 3, includes all workers employed by firms
with at least 50 employees in a representative longitudinal sample of Italian manu-
facturing firms between 1982 and 1997.6 Because we observe all workers and their
compensation, we can evaluate the impact of female leadership on the wage distri-
bution at the firm level. The data set is rich in firm-level characteristics, including
several measures of firm performance. We merge this sample with social security
administration data containing the complete labor market trajectories of all workers
who ever transited through any of the sampled firms. This allows us to identify
firm, worker and executive fixed effects in a joint two-way fixed effects regressions
à la Abowd et al. (1999) and Abowd et al. (2002). These fixed effects and controls
help address the scarcity of worker-level characteristics in our data set, and allow us
to control for unobservable heterogeneity at the workforce, firm and executive level
which would otherwise bias the estimates.
We describe our empirical strategy and present the estimation results in Section
4. Thanks to the richness of our data, we can analyze the impact on the entire wage
distribution within the firm allowing for heterogenous effects across workers. Our
regressions by wage quantiles show that this heterogeneity is relevant: the impact
of having a female CEO is positive on women at the top of the wage distribution
but negative on women at the bottom of the wage distribution. These effects are
consistent with our model, and not consistent with alternative mechanisms through
which female CEOs could affect women’s wages, as we discuss in detail in Section
5. Also, consistent with our model’s predictions, female CEOs are associated with
lower wages for men at the top, and higher wages for men at the bottom of the
wage distribution. As a result, we find that, as implied by our model, female CEOs
reduce the gender wage gap at the top and widen it at the bottom of the wage
distribution, with essentially no effects at the mean. Our results are robust to
alternative specifications, such as an alternative measure of female leadership (the
proportion of the firm’s executives who are female) and to the selection induced by
entry and exit of firms and workers.
We also analyze the impact of female leadership on firm performance, measured
by sales per worker, value added per worker, and total factor productivity (TFP). We
find that, as predicted by the model, the impact of female CEOs on firm performance
6This is the only period over which our data are available and this is the reason why we cannot
provide an analysis using more recent data.
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is a positive function of the proportion of female workers employed by the firm. The
magnitude of the impact is substantial: a female CEO would increase overall sales
per employee by about 3.7% if leading a firm employing the average proportion of
women.
Using our estimates, we perform a partial equilibrium counterfactual exercise
to compute the cost of women’s underrepresentation in leadership positions. Our
results indicate that if female CEOs were in charge of all firms with at least a 20%
proportion of female workers (about 50 percent of the sample), sales per worker
would increase by 14% in the “treated” firms, and by 6.7% in the overall sample of
firms.
There is a large literature studying gender differentials in the labor market, and
a fairly developed literature studying gender differentials using matched employer-
employee data. However, the literature on the relationship between the gender of
the firm’s executives and gender-specific wages is scant and has focused on the effect
on average wages, not on the effect over the entire wage distribution. Bell (2005)
studies the impact of female leadership in US firms but only on executives’ wages.
Cardoso and Winter-Ebmer (2010) consider the effect on all workers in a sample of
Portuguese firms but without allowing for heterogeneous effects over the distribution.
Fadlon (2010) tests a model of statistical discrimination similar to ours and assesses
the impact of supervisors’ gender on workers’ wages using U.S. data but does not
focus on the wage distribution and does not look at wages at the firm level. Gagliar-
ducci and Paserman (2014) use German linked employer-employee data to study the
effect of the gender composition of the first two layers of management on firm and
worker outcomes. They find that the effect of female leadership is heterogeneous
and depends on the share of women in the second layer of the organization: Women
in the top layer who are surrounded by men reduce wages of both men and women,
while the effect is reversed as the share of women in the second layer increases. A
related literature, sparked by recent reforms in European countries, looks at the
impact of the gender of a firm’s board members instead of its executives. Bertrand
et al. (2014) documents that a reform mandating gender quotas for the boards of
Norwegian companies reduced the gender gap in earnings within board members but
did not have a significant impact on overall gender wage gaps.
Existing literature on the effect of female leadership on firm performance is also
limited. Many contributions focus on financial performance looking at the impact
on stock prices, stock returns and market values.7 By conditioning on a wide range
7See for example, Wolfers (2006), Albanesi and Olivetti (2009), Ahern and Dittmar (2012); in
the strategy literature, Dezsö and Ross (2012), Adams and Ferreira (2009), Farrell and Hersch
(2005). Rare exceptions are Matsa and Miller (2013), which looks at operating profits, Smith et al.
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of firm-level controls and using less volatile measures of firm performance, we can
run firm-level regressions closer to our model’s implications.
In Section 5, we present alternative explanations for gender inequality and il-
lustrate why they do not perform as well as our model in explaining the evidence
we uncover. In Section 6 we conclude by discussing some policy implications of our
findings.
2 Theoretical Framework
We present a simple signal extraction model where inequalities are generated by em-
ployers’ incomplete information about workers’ productivity and where employers’
gender matters. The main assumption of our model is that female and male execu-
tives are better equipped at assessing the skills of employees of their same gender. As
discussed in greater detail below, this may be the result of better communication and
better aptitude at interpersonal relationships among individuals of the same gender,
of more similar cultural background shared by individuals of the same gender, or
other factors. From the model we derive a set of implications that we test in our
empirical analysis.
2.1 Environment
We extend the standard statistical discrimination model in Phelps (1972) to in-
clude two types of employers (female and male), and two types of jobs (simple and
complex). The two-jobs extension allows us to obtain implications for efficiency
(productivity), which is one focus of our empirical analysis.8 Female (f) and male
(m) workers have ability q which is distributed normally with mean µ and variance
σ2. Ability, productivity and wages are expressed in logarithms. CEOs observe a
signal of ability s = q+ , where  is distributed normally with mean 0 and variance
σ2g where g is workers’ gender m or f . The signal’s variance can be interpreted as a
measure of the signal’s information quality. Employers assign workers to one of two
jobs: one requiring complex (c) tasks to be performed and the other requiring simple
tasks (e) to be performed. To capture the importance of correctly assigning workers
to tasks, we assume that mismatches are costlier in the complex job, where workers
with higher ability are more productive. One way to model this requirement is by
(2006), with information on value added and profits on a panel of Danish firms, and Rose (2007),
which looks at Tobin’s Q.
8In the standard model of Phelps (1972) discrimination has a purely redistributive nature. If
employers were not allowed to use race as a source of information, production would not increase,
but this is due to the extreme simplicity of the model. See Fang and Moro (2011) for details.
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assuming that the dollar value of productivity of workers in the complex (simple)
job is h (l) if workers have ability q > q, and −h (−l) otherwise, with h > l ≥ 0.9
Firms compete for workers and maximize output given wages. Workers care only
about wages and not about job assignment per se.
2.2 Homogenous CEOs
It is helpful to start the analysis by exploring the effect of the worker’s signal precision
on labor market outcomes when all CEOs are of the same gender, let us assume male;
in subsection 2.3 we will extend the environment to include female CEOs.
Firms’ competition for workers implies that in equilibrium each worker is paid
his or her expected marginal product, which depends on her expected ability E(q|s).
Standard properties of the bivariate normal distribution10 imply that E(q|s) = (1−
αg)µ+αgs, where αg = σ2/(σ2g +σ2). Expected ability is a weighted average of the
population average skill and the signal, with weights equal to the relative variance of
the two variables. When the signal is perfectly informative (σg = 0), the population
mean is ignored; when the signal is pure noise (σg =∞), expected ability is equal to
the population average. With a partially informative signal, the conditional expected
ability is increasing in both q and s.
The conditional distribution, which we denote with φg(q|s) is also normal, with
mean equal to E(q|s) and variance σ2(1−αg), g = {m, f}. Denote the corresponding
cumulative distributions with Φg(q|s).
It is optimal for employers to use a cutoff job assignment rule: workers will
be employed in job c if s ≥ sg. The cutoff sg is computed by equating expected
productivity in the two jobs, as the unique solution to
h (Pr(q ≥ q|s, g)− Pr(q < q|s, g)) = l (Pr(q ≥ q|s, g)− Pr(q < q|s, g)) . (2.1)
We denote this solution with s(σg) to stress its dependence on the signal’s precision.
The worker with signal s(σg) has the same expected productivity (zero) in both
jobs.11 Competition ensures that wages w are equal to expected marginal products,
9The threshold rule for productivity is a strong assumption, which we adopted to simplify the
derivation of the model’s outcome, but it is not crucial. What is crucial is that productivity increases
with ability, and that lower ability workers are more costly mismatched in the complex job.
10See Eaton (1983)
11Equation 2.1 is satisfied when Pr(q ≥ q|s, g) = 1/2 because of the extreme symmetry of the
setup. This implies also that expected productivity is zero for workers with signal equal to the
threshold. This can be relaxed: all that is needed to obtain our qualitative implications is that
productivity increases with ability, and a comparative advantage to place higher ability workers in
the complex job.
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Figure 1: Simulation of the solution to the problem with parameters σ=1,
q = 1.5, µ = 1, h = 2, l = 1.
which are functions of the signal received and the worker’s gender:
w(s;σg) =
l (1− 2Φg(q|s)) if s <sgh (1− 2Φg(q|s)) if s ≥ sg . (2.2)
We now explore the properties of the wage schedule as a function of the signal’s
noise variance σ2g. Figure 1 displays the outcome for workers with two different
values of σ2g. The red continuous line displays the equilibrium wages resulting from
a more precise signal than the blue dashed line. As standard in statistical discrim-
ination models, the line corresponding to the more precise signal is steeper than
the line corresponding to the less precise signal. This is the direct implication of
putting more weight on the signal in the first case than in the second. As a result of
one of our extensions - the presence of job assignment between simple and complex
jobs - the two lines also display a non-standard feature: a kink in correspondence to
the threshold signal. The kink is a result of the optimal assignment rule: workers
with signals below the threshold are assigned to the simple job, where ability affects
productivity less than in the complex job, therefore both wage curves are flatter to
the left of the thresholds than to the right of the thresholds.
The following proposition states that the expected marginal product of a worker
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is higher when the signal is noisier if the signal is small enough. Conversely, for
a high enough signal, the expected marginal product will be lower the noisier the
signal. Formally,
Proposition 1. Let w(s;σg) be the equilibrium wage as a function of the workers’
signal for group g, extracting a signal with noise standard deviation equal to σg.
If σf > σm then there exists ŝ such that w(s;σf ) > w(s;σm) for all s < ŝ and
w(s;σf ) < w(s;σm) for all s > ŝ.
The proof is in Appendix A. This “single-crossing” property of the wage functions
of signals of different precision relies to some extent on the assumptions of symmetry
of the production function and of the signaling technology distributions. However the
result that a more precise signal implies higher wages at the top of the distribution,
and lower wages at the bottom, is more general, and will hold even if the wages cross
more than once.
The next proposition states that productivity is higher when the signal is more
precise. This follows observing that expected ability is closer to the workers’ signal
when σ2g is smaller.
Proposition 2. Let yg(σg) be the total production of workers from group g when
their signal’s noise has standard deviation σg. Production yg is decreasing in σg.
For example, with the parameters used in Figure 1, and assuming that female
workers are those with the larger signal noise variance (σm= 1 and σf = 2), 24
percent of males and 13.2 percent of females are employed in the complex job. Be-
cause there are fewer females than males in the right tail of the quality distribution
conditional on any given signal, more females are mismatched, therefore males’ total
value of (log) production is equal to -0.29, whereas females’ is -0.35. To assess the
inefficiency cost arising from incomplete information, consider that if workers were
efficiently assigned, the value of production would be 1.31 for each group.
2.3 Heterogenous CEOs: Female and Male
Consider now an environment in which some firms are managed by female CEOs
and some by male CEOs.12 We assume that female CEOs are characterized by a
better ability to assess the productivity of female workers, that is, female workers’
signal is extracted from a more precise distribution, with noise variance σ2F < σ
2
f
12We do not model the change in CEO gender at this stage or how the CEO is selected as we are
interested in comparing differences in gender-specific wage distributions between firms where the
top management has different gender.
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(where the capital F denotes female workers when assessed by a female CEO, and
lowercase f when assessed by a male CEO). Symmetrically, female CEOs evaluate
male workers’ with lower precision than male CEOs: σ2M > σ
2
m.
This assumption may be motivated by any difference in language, verbal and
non-verbal communication styles and perceptions that may make it easier between
people of the same gender to provide a better understanding of personal skills and
attitudes, improve conflict resolutions, assignment to job-tasks, etc. A large socio-
linguistic literature has found differences in verbal and non-verbal communication
styles between groups defined by race or gender that may affect economic and social
outcomes (see e.g. Dindia and Canary (2006) and Scollon et al. (2011)).13 Recent
employee surveys also indicate that significant communication barriers between men
and women exist in the workplace (Angier and Axelrod (2014), Ellison and Mullin
(2014)). In the economics literature, several theoretical papers have adopted an as-
sumption similar to ours. Lang (1986) develops a theory of discrimination based on
language barriers between “speech communities” defined by race or gender. To moti-
vate this assumption, Lang surveys the socio-linguistic literature demonstrating the
existence of such communication barriers. Cornell and Welch (1996) adopt the same
assumption in a model of screening discrimination. Morgan and Várdy (2009) dis-
cuss a model where hiring policies are affected by noisy signals of productivity, whose
informativeness depends (as in our assumption) on group identity because of differ-
ences in “discourse systems”. More recently, Bagues and Perez-Villadoniga (2013)’s
model generates a similar-to-me-in-skills result where employers endogenously give
higher valuations to candidates who excel in the same dimensions as them. This
result can also provide a foundation to our assumption if female workers are more
likely to excel on the same dimensions as female executives.
The equilibrium features described in Section 2.2 carry through in the envi-
ronment with heterogenous CEOs. In this new environment we can compare the
equilibrium wages and firm performance in firms with CEOs of different gender. Fo-
cus for example on the wage distributions of female workers. Figure 2 displays the
wage distributions of female workers employed at firms with female or male CEOs.
The distribution displayed by the dashed blue line was computed using a signal with
noise variance σ2f = 3, representing draws from the (less precise) signals received
by male CEOs; the distribution displayed by the solid red line was computed using
a signal with noise variance σ2F = 2, representing draws from the (more precise)
signals received by female CEOs. As stated in Proposition 1, Figure 2 shows that
13There exists also an extensive medical literature showing how physician-patient interactions
are affected by the gender of both the physician and the patient (see Cooper-Patrick et al. (1999)
Rathore et al. (2001), and Schmid Mast et al. (2007)).
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Figure 2: Simulation of the wage distributions of female workers
the wage distribution of female workers employed at female CEOs firms has thicker
tails.14 Women working for a female CEO are more likely to be assigned to the
complex task and they earn higher wages at same signals for all the signals above
the single crossing reported in Figure 1. This generates the fatter right tail. Below
the threshold corresponding to the single crossing, women working for a female CEO
earn lower wages at same signal than women working for a male CEO because the
female CEO has a better assessment of how low productivity really is in those cases.
This generates the fatter left tail.
The following prediction follows directly from Proposition 1:
Empirical implication 1. Wages of female workers in firms with female CEOs are
higher at the top of the wage distribution, and lower at the bottom of the wage distri-
bution relative to wages of female workers employed by male CEOs. Symmetrically,
wages of male workers in firms with female CEOs are higher at the bottom and lower
at the top of the wage distribution relative to wages of male workers employed by
male CEOs.
As a result, and as Figure 2 makes clear, we should also expect the variance of
14Other parameters used in this simulation: σ = 1, q = 1, µ = .5, h = 1.1, l = 1. We picked these
parameters to produce a graph that could show the qualitative features of the proposition.
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the wage distribution of female workers employed by female CEOs to be higher than
the variance of the wage distribution of female workers employed by male CEOs.
The opposite should be true on the variance of male wages.
The model has implications for firm performance as well. Proposition 2 states
that total production is higher the lower the signal noise since CEOs can better match
workers to jobs. As a result, we should observe that female CEOs can improve firm
performance by implementing a better assignment of female workers.15 Therefore,
we will test the following empirical prediction:
Empirical implication 2. The productivity of firms with female CEOs increases
with the share of female workers.
We derived Propositions 1 and 2 using specific distributional assumptions, but
the empirical implications are robust to alternative distributions of the signal’s noise
and of the underlying productivity. A higher signal precision always implies less mis-
matching of workers to jobs, and a higher correlation of signals with productivity
always implies lower wages when the signal is small and higher wages when the signal
is high. These implications are also robust to alternative specifications of the signal
extraction technology. In the online appendix (Flabbi et al. (2014)), we derive the
same empirical implications assuming a dynamic model where signals are extracted
every period. Assuming all firms initially have male CEOs, firms acquiring female
CEOs update the expected productivity of female workers with higher precision.
The implications follow because female CEOs will rely on a larger number of more
precise signals from female workers than male CEOs.
We do not model explicitly the selection process into executive positions (al-
though in the empirical part we will take into account that such process might differ
by gender) or how labor force dynamics are affected by CEO gender in a “general
equilibrium”. The change of a CEO’s gender in our model will affect incentives for
workers to leave the firm hoping to extract a more advantageous signal. Our results
therefore assume rigidities in workforce mobility, which can be motivated by costs of
hiring and firing. However, the equilibrium wages by CEO and worker’s gender de-
rived in our propositions are nevertheless optimal and are indicative of the directions
of wage changes we should expect when a CEO of different gender is appointed.16
15Of course female CEO’s assignment of male workers has the opposite implication, but female
CEOs, upon assuming leadership, could “trust” the previous assignment of male workers made by
a male CEO. We do not model explicitly job reassignment, but the following proposition holds
regardless of whether or not the female CEO’s reassigns men to different tasks from those chosen
by a previous male CEO.
16This motivates in the empirical analysis the inclusion, in our benchmark specification, only of
data from workers that were not hired after the new CEO was appointed. We check the robustness
of our results to the inclusion of all workers.
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3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.1 Data Sources and Estimation Samples
We use data from three sources that we label INVIND, INPS and CADS. From
these three sources of data, we build a matched employer-employee panel data set
and from this matched data set we extract our final estimation samples.
INVIND stands for the Bank of Italy’s annual survey of manufacturing firms,
an open panel of about 1,000 firms per year, representative of Italian manufactur-
ing firms with at least 50 employees. INPS stands for the National Social Secu-
rity Institute which provided the work histories of all workers ever employed at an
INVIND firm in the period 1980-1997,17 including spells of employment in firms
not included in the INVIND survey. We match the INVIND firms with the INPS
work histories thanks to unique worker and firms identifiers to create what we call
the INVIND-INPS data set. This data set includes for each worker: gender, age,
tenure18, occupational status (production workers, non-production workers, execu-
tives), annual gross earnings (including overtime pay, shift work pay and bonuses),
number of weeks worked, and a firm identifier. We exclude all records with missing
entries on either the firm or the worker identifier, those for workers younger than
15, and those corresponding to workers with less than four weeks worked in a given
year. For each worker-year, we kept only the observation corresponding to the main
job (the job with the highest number of weeks worked). Overall, the INVIND-INPS
data set includes information on about a million workers per year, more than half
of whom are employed in INVIND firms in any given year. The remaining workers
are employed in about 450,000 other companies of which we only know the firm
identifier.
In Table 1 we report summary statistics on workers’ characteristics for the
INVIND-INPS data set. About 67% of observations pertain to production work-
ers, 31% to non-production employees, and 2.2% to executives. Even though they
represent about 21% of the workforce, women are only 2.5% of executives. On av-
erage, workers are 37 years old and have 5 years of tenure. Average gross weekly
earnings at 1995 constant prices are around 388 euros, with women earning about
24% less than men (309 euros vs. 408 euros).
CADS, the third data source we use, stands for Company Accounts Data Service
17The provision of these work histories data for the employees of the INVIND firms was done
only once in the history of the data set and therefore can only cover firms and workers up to 1997.
This is the reason why we cannot work on more recent data.
18Tenure information is left-censored because we do not have information on workers prior to
1981.
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and includes balance-sheet information for a sample of about 40,000 firms between
1982 and 1997, including almost all INVIND firms. The data include information
on industry, location, sales, revenues, value added at the firm-year level, and a firm
identifier. Again thanks to a unique and common firm identifier, we can match
CADS with INVIND-INPS.
We will focus most of our empirical analysis on the balanced panel sample con-
sisting of firms continuously observed in the period 1988-1997. In Table 1 we report
summary statistics both on this sample and on the entire, unbalanced INVIND-
INPS-CADS sample for the same period. Notice that the unit of observation on the
sample is a firm in a given year while in the INVIND-INPS was a worker in a given
firm in a given year. The unbalanced INPS-INVIND-CADS panel includes 5,029
firm-year observations from a total of 795 unique firms. Of these, 234 compose the
balanced panel. In the unbalanced sample, average gross weekly earnings at 1995
constant prices are equal to about 405 euros. On average, workers are 37.2 years old
and have 8 years of tenure in the firm. About 68% of the workers are blue collar, 30%
white collar, and 2.5% are executives. The corresponding statistics in the balanced
sample are very similar.
3.2 Female Leadership
We identify female leadership from the job classification executive19 in the data. As
already observed by Bandiera et al. (2011), one advantage of using data from Italy
is that this indicator is very reliable because the job title of executive is subject to
a different type of labor contract and executives are registered in a separate account
with the social security administration agency (INPS). We identify the CEO as the
executive with the highest compensation in a firm-year. This procedure is supported
by the following: i) Salary determination in the Italian manufacturing sector is such
that the compensation ordering follows very closely the hierarchical ranking within
each of the three broad categories we observe (executives, non-production workers,
production workers); ii) The firm’s CEO is classified within the executive category;
iii) We have a very detailed and precise measure of compensation because we have
direct access to the administrative data that each firm is required by law to report
(and that each worker has the incentive to verify is correctly reported); iv) We have
access to all the workers employed by a given firm in a given year.20
19The original job description in Italian is dirigente, which corresponds to an executive in a US
firm.
20We have the complete set of workers only for the INVIND firms and as a result we can only
assign CEO’s gender to INVIND firms. However, this is irrelevant for our final estimation sample
at the firm level since for other reasons explained below we limit our main empirical analysis to a
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics: INVIND-INPS sample and INVIND-
INPS-CADS sample
INVIND-INPS INVIND-INPS-CADS
Unbalanced Balanced
panel panel
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
% Prod. workers 66.5 67.6 (18.7 ) 67.4 (18.3)
% Non-prod. wrk 31.3 29.8 (17.7) 30.0 (17.3)
% Executives 2.2 2.5 (1.7) 2.6 (1.8)
% Females 21.1 26.2 (20.9) 25.8 (20.1)
% Fem. execs. 2.5 3.3 (10.3) 3.4 (10.1)
% Female CEO 2.1 1.8
Age 37.0 (10.1) 37.2 (3.6) 37.4 (3.4)
Tenure 5.1 (4.1) 8.1 (2.6) 8.7 (2.3)
Wage (weekly) 387.2 (253.8) 400.3 (86.0) 404.5 (88.7)
Wage (males) 408.1 (271.8) 429.3 (92.7) 433.9 (97.5)
Wage (females) 309.5 (146.6) 343.3 (67.0) 346.4 (68.5)
Firm size (empl.) 675.0 (2,628.6) 704.2 (1,306.9)
Sales (’000 euros) 110,880 (397,461) 118,475 (231,208)
Sales/worker (ln) 4.93 (0.62) 4.95 (0.57)
Val. add./wkr (ln) 3.77 (0.43) 3.79 (0.41)
TFP 2.49 (0.50) 2.49 (0.49)
N. Observations 18,664,304 5,029 2,340
N. Firms 448,284 795 234
N. Workers 1,724,609
N. Years 17 15 10
Using these definitions, we find that although females are 26.2% of the workforce
in INVIND firms, they are only 3.3% of the executives, and only 2.1% of CEOs. The
descriptive statistics for the balanced panel are quite similar to those referring to the
unbalanced sample and confirm the underrepresentation of women in top positions
in firms found for other countries. In particular, the ratio between women in the
labor force and women classified as executives is very similar to the ratio obtained
from the ExecuComp21 data for the U.S.
subset of INVIND firms.
21Execucomp is compiled by Standard and Poor and contains information on executives in the
S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400, S&P SmallCap 600. See for example, Bertrand and Hallock (2001),
Wolfers (2006), Gayle et al. (2012), Dezsö and Ross (2012).
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics: Firms with Male and Female CEO in
INVIND-INPS-CADS sample
Male CEO Female CEO
Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev.
CEO’s age 49.5 (7.1) 46.6 (7.1)
CEO’s tenure 4.4 (3.7) 4.0 (2.8)
CEO’s annual earnings 199,385 (144,508) 128,157 (54,643)
% Production workers 67.5 (18.7) 75.4 (13.5)
% Non-prod. workers 30.0 (17.8) 22.2 (13.1)
% Executives 2.5 (1.7) 2.4 (1.4)
% Females 25.9 (20.7) 37.2 (27.0)
% Female executives 2.4 (6.9) 46.8 (29.5)
% Female executives (excl. CEO) 3.3 (10.3) 15.9 (28.6)
Firm size (employment) 683.7 (2,655.4) 270.3 (409.9)
Age 37.2 (3.6) 35.9 (3.5)
Tenure 8.1 (2.6) 8.6 (2.2)
Wage (earnings/week) 401.6 (86.0) 341.3 (61.7)
Wage (males) 430.6 (92.8) 369.4 (64.2)
Wage (females) 343.3 (66.2) 345.4 (97.1)
Sales (thousand euros) 112,467 (401,486) 37,185 (55,982)
Sales per worker (ln) 4.9 (0.6) 4.7 (0.6)
Value added per worker (ln) 3.8 (0.4) 3.6 (0.4)
TFP 2.5 (0.5 ) 2.4 (0.5)
N. Observations 4,923 106
N. Firms 788 60 33
N. Years 15 10
Women’s representation in executive positions in Italy has increased over time
but remains small: In 1980, slightly above 10 percent of firms had at least one female
executive, and females represented 2% of all executives and 1% of CEOs; In 1997,
these figures were 20%, 4% and 2%, respectively. There is substantial variation
across industries in the presence of females in the executive ranks, but no obvious
pattern emerges about the relationship between female leadership and the presence
of females in the non-executive workforce in the various industries.22
In Table 2 we compare firms with a male CEO with those with a female CEO.
Firms with a female CEO are smaller, both in terms of employment and in terms of
22See Table B1 in Flabbi et al. (2014) for details.
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revenues, pay lower wages, and employ a larger share of blue collar workers. Firms
with a female CEO also employ a larger share of female workers (37 vs. 26 percent).
However, when one looks at measures of productivity (sales per employee, value
added per employee, and TFP), the differences shrink considerably. For instance,
total revenue is on average about 3 times higher in firms with a male CEO than in
firms with a female CEO, but revenue per employee, value added per employee and
TFP are only about 21 percent, 19 percent and 4 percent higher, respectively.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Specification and Identification
The unit of observation of our analysis is a given firm j observed in a given year t.
We are interested in the impact of female leadership on workers’ wage distributions
and firms’ performance.
We will estimate regressions of the following form:
yjt = βFLEADjt+FIRM
′
jtγ+WORK
′
jtδ+EXEC
′
jtχ+λj +ηt+τt(j)t+εjt (4.1)
where: yjt is the dependent variable of interest (either moments of the workers’ wage
distribution or measures of firm performance) and β is the coefficient of interest. The
regressors and controls are defined as follows: FLEADjt is the measure of female
leadership used in the regression: either a female CEO dummy or the fraction of
female executives; FIRMjt is a vector of observable time-varying firm character-
istics (dummies for size, industry, and region); WORKjt is a vector of observable
workforce characteristics aggregated at the firm-year level (age, tenure, occupation
distribution, fraction female) plus worker fixed effects aggregated at the firm-year
level and estimated in a “first stage” regression described in detail below; EXECjt
is a vector of observable characteristics of the firm leadership used in the regres-
sion (age and tenure as CEO or executive) plus CEO’s or executives’ fixed effects
estimated in the first stage regression described in detail below;23 λj are firm fixed
effects; ηt are year dummies and τt(j) are industry-specific time trends.
The main challenge in estimating the impact of female CEOs (or female leader-
ship in general)24 on workers’ wages and firms’ performance is the sample selection
23When the female leadership measures is the female CEO dummy we simply use the CEO’s
value of the listed regressors; when the leadership measure is the proportion of female executives
at the firms, we use the average of the listed regressors over the firm’s executives.
24To simplify the discussion, we present the identification for the case in which female leadership
is represented by the dummy female CEO. The same discussion carries through when we use the
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bias induced by the non-random assignment of CEOs to firms. In particular, it is
possible that (a) unobservable firm characteristics may make some firms more pro-
ductive than others, and this unobserved firm-level component may not be randomly
assigned between male- and female-led firms, (b) the workforce composition of firms
led by women might systematically differ from that of firms led by men, and (c)
the selection on unobserved individual ability in the position of CEO may not be
the same by gender so that women CEOs may be of systematically higher or lower
ability than men CEOs, and female leadership indicators might be capturing such
differences rather than gender effects.
Our strategy to address these issues is to control for firm fixed effects, workforce
composition effects, and CEO effects. Thanks to the panel structure of the data, we
can control for time-invariant firm-level heterogeneity by estimating equations (4.1)
as firm fixed effects regressions; we can also include controls for a set of time-varying,
observable firm characteristics, workforce characteristics, and CEO characteristics.
Moreover, as we describe in the next paragraph, we exploit the employer-employee
nature of our data to construct controls for unobservable workforce and CEO ability.
Our matched employer-employee data includes the entire work history of all the
workers who ever transited through one of our J INVIND firms. This large matched
employer-employee data set (almost 19 million worker-year observations) contains
a large number of transitions of individuals across (INVIND and non-INVIND)
firms and is thus well suited to estimate two-way fixed effects as in Abowd et al.
(1999)(henceforth, AKM). An individual fixed effect estimated from such a regres-
sion has the advantage of controlling for the firms the worker or executive has ever
worked for. As a result, it can capture those scale effects in individual productiv-
ity which are usually captured by education, other time-invariant human capital or
other proxies for “ability” and skills.25
Our strategy is to use the individual fixed effects from an AKM regression to con-
struct proxies for CEO/executive and average worker heterogeneity at the firm-year
level to include as controls in regression 4.1. Specifically, we perform the two-way
fixed effect procedure proposed by Abowd et al. (2002) by estimating the following
equation:
wit = s
′
itβ + ηt + αi +
J∑
j=1
djitΨj + ζit. (4.2)
fraction of female executives as a measure of female leadership.
25Including these controls as described in detail below also helps alleviate the fact that our data
set, as is frequently the case with administrative data, does not include a particularly rich set of
controls at the individual worker level. For example, we have no measure of education or other
formal training in the data which are usually included as controls in wage regressions.
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The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of weekly wages. The vector of
observable individual characteristics, s′, includes age, age squared, tenure, tenure
squared, a dummy variable for non-production workers, a dummy for executives
(occupational status changes over time for a considerable number of workers), as
well as a full set of interactions of these variables with a female dummy (to allow the
returns to age, tenure and occupation to vary by gender), and a set of year dummies.
Our original sample consists of essentially one large connected group (comprising 99%
of the sample). Thus, in our estimation we focus only on this connected group and
disregard the remaining observations. The identification of firm effects and worker
effects is delivered by the relatively high mobility of workers in the sample over the
relatively long period under consideration: about 70 percent of workers have more
than one employer during the 1980-1997 period, and between 8 and 15 percent of
workers change employer in a given year. The αˆi obtained by this procedure for the
firms’ CEOs and executives are included in the vector EXECjt to control for CEO’s
individual heterogeneity. Moreover, we also used them to compute the mean αˆi on
the workers of a given firm j in time t, which we then include among the controls
for workforce composition (WORKjt).26
The AKM method hinges crucially on the assumptions of exogenous mobility
of workers across firms conditional on observables. We follow Card et al. (2013)
(CHK henceforth) in performing several tests to probe the validity of the assump-
tion. Specifically, a model including unrestricted match effects delivers only a very
modest improved statistical fit compared to the AKM model, and the departures
from the exogenous mobility assumption suggested by the AKM residuals are small
in magnitude. Moreover, wage changes for job movers show patterns that suggest
that worker-firm match effects are not a primary driver of mobility in the Italian
manufacturing sector. Instead, the patterns that we uncover are consistent with the
predictions of the AKM model for job movers. We conclude that in our context, sim-
ilarly to what found by CHK in the case of Germany, the additively separable firm
and worker effects obtained from the AKM model can be taken as reasonable mea-
sures of the unobservable worker and firm components of wages. Tests and results
are reported in detail in the Flabbi et al. (2014). The two-way fixed effect regressions
generate expected results: wages exhibit concave age and tenure profiles, and there
26Under our model, the workers’ wages from which we have estimated these worker fixed effects
are affected by statistical discrimination. This does not introduce a bias in the estimate of the mean
αˆi on the workers of a given firm j in time t because the model, as common in standard statistical
discrimination models, does not imply “group discrimination”. Moreover, the group of workers we
have at each firm is large enough to deliver credible estimates: Our firms are relatively large by
construction (firms are included in the INVIND sample only if they employ at least 50 employees)
and the median number of workers in INVIND firms is around 250.
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is a substantial wage premium associated with white collar jobs and, especially, with
executive positions.
4.2 Female Leadership and Firm-Level Workers Wages
Distributions
In the model we presented in Section 2, female CEOs extract more precise signals
of productivity from female workers. A more precise signal implies that women at
the top of the wage distribution should see higher wages than females at the top
of the distribution employed by male CEOs. Women at the bottom of the wage
distribution, on the other hand, should see lower wages when employed by female
CEOs. As a result, the overall wage dispersion of female workers in each firm should
be higher if in firms managed by women CEOs.
To test this prediction, we estimate equation (4.1) where the dependent variable
yjt is a set of firm- and gender-specific statistics of the workers’ wages distribution:
standard deviation, average wages below and above the median, below the 10th
and above the 90th percentile, and average wages within each quartile of the wage
distribution. Our main regressor of interest is the measure of female leadership:
a female CEO dummy or the share of female executives. As described in Section
4.1, all regressions include firm fixed-effects, time-varying firm controls, workforce
composition controls and controls for CEOs’ characteristics.27
Figure 3 summarizes our main results by reporting the estimated coefficients on
the female CEO dummy on the four quartiles of the wage distribution using our
benchmark specification. The red continuous line shows that female leadership has
a positive effect on female wages at the top of distribution and a negative effect at
the bottom of the distribution. The effect on the male wage distribution is symmet-
ric and of the opposite sign, as illustrated by the blue dashed line. These effects are
consistently increasing, moving from the bottom to the top of the female wage dis-
tribution, whereas they are decreasing moving from the bottom to the top the male
distribution. These results conform to Empirical prediction 1 derived in Section 2.
To provide details on the precision and robustness of these results, we report the
estimated effects of the variable indicating female leadership on various moments of
the female wage distribution in Table 3 and of the male wage distribution in Table
27The complete set of controls includes: CEO age, tenure as CEO, CEO fixed effects computed
in the 2-way fixed-effects regression described above, the fraction of non-executive female workers,
the fraction of non-production workers, the mean age of the workforce, the average of workers’ fixed
effects computed in the 2-way AKM fixed-effects regression, a set of 15 region dummies, 20 industry
dummies, 4 firm-size dummies, year dummies, and industry-specific time trends.
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Figure 3: Coefficients of female CEO dummy on average wages by quantile
of the female and male wage distributions
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4, according to six different specifications (panels (a) through (f)).28 Coefficient
estimates for the more relevant controls are reported for the benchmark specification
in the Appendix.
Panel (a) reports the results of our benchmark specification, where the measure
of female leadership is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is managed by
a female CEO. This specification is estimated using the balanced sample to avoid
the selection of firms entering and exiting the sample. To eliminate possible con-
founding effects induced by workers being hired or leaving after the appointment of
the female CEO, this specification uses only observations on workers hired under the
previous CEO and who stay at the firm during the female CEO’s tenure. The other
specifications inform the reader whether and how this sample selection and choice
of variables affect our results. The specification in panel (b) comprises all workers,
including those hired by the female CEO. The specification in panel (c) includes
an additional control for whether the CEO was recently appointed; this is done to
28Dependent variables in columns (4)-(9) are defined as follows: Decile 1 (column 4): average
wage of earners below the 10th percentile of the wage distribution. Decile 10 (column 5): average
wage of earners above the 90th percentile. Quantile 1: average wages below the 25th percentile;
Quantile 2: average wages between the 25th and 50th percentile; Quantile 3: average wages between
the 50th and the 75th percentile; Quantile 4: average wages above the 75th percentile of the wage
distribution.
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account for the concern that the female CEO dummy might just be capturing the
effect of a CEO change. Panel (d) reports the results from the benchmark specifica-
tion estimated on the full (unbalanced) panel, to check whether firm selection into
the sample plays a relevant role. Panel (e) reports results using a different measure
of female leadership: the proportion of female executives.29 Finally, results in panel
(f) are obtained from regressions that do not include the controls for unobserved
workforce heterogeneity and CEO ability.
For each specification, the tables report the coefficient on the measure of female
leadership. In addition, because our model makes specific predictions on the effects
of female leadership on the wage variance, and on wages at the top and bottom
of the gender-specific wage distributions, we report the p-values of 1-tailed tests
of the model’s predictions.30 Specifically, we test the null hypothesis that female
leadership has zero impact on the dependent variable against different alternatives
specified according to the predictions of the model. That is, we test against the
alternative hypothesis that female leadership has a positive impact on the variance
of female wages, a positive impact at the top of the female wages distribution and
a negative impact at the bottom. On the corresponding moments of the male wage
distribution, the alternative hypothesis is that the impact of female leadership has
the opposite signs. Top and bottom are defined as above and below the median.31
The results can be summarized as follows.
(i) Female leadership has a strong, economically and statistically significant pos-
itive effect on the variance of women’s wages, as predicted by the theory; the effect is
robust in all specifications (see column 1). The standard deviation of female wages
is almost 50% larger when the firm is managed by a female CEO in our benchmark
specification, and over 40% larger in the other specifications using this measure of
female leadership. The effect on the male wage variance is also strong (between 10
and 23 percent) and, as predicted by our model, consistently of the opposite sign,
but less precisely estimated in most specifications. The null hypothesis that the
29Because there are more firms with at least some female executives than firms with a female
CEO, this specification includes a larger number of firms providing a source of variation in female
leadership compared to the other specifications.
30Given that individual CEO effects are generated regressors from a first stage estimation, in
all specifications except (f), P-values are computed using bootstrapped standard errors with 300
replications. As described in detail in the Appendix, our bootstrapping procedure resamples firms,
stratifying by firms that never had a female CEO and firms that had a female CEO. In specification
(f), standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Standard errors are reported in the Appendix
for the benchmark specification and in the Web Appendix for the other specifications.
31Note that the theory predicts that the effects of female leadership should be positive or negative
at the top or bottom but does not predict non-parametrically where the change of sign should occur.
Therefore, choosing the median is arbitrary. This is the reason why we add other possible cuts to
the wage distribution: top and bottom 10% and quartiles.
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Table 3: Impact of female leadership on moments of the firm-level female
wage distributions
Dependent
variable:
→ Standard
deviation
Average wages
Median Decile Quantiles
Below Above 1 10 1 2 3 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(a) Benchmark
Coefficient 0.475 -0.030 0.078 -0.043 0.167 -0.031 -0.026 0.006 0.104
1-tail P-value 0.000 0.090 0.003 0.124 0.004 0.147 0.112 0.424 0.001
(b) All workers
Coefficient 0.418 -0.032 0.049 -0.038 0.121 -0.036 -0.027 -0.020 0.072
1-tail P-value 0.000 0.041 0.062 0.146 0.009 0.108 0.043 0.824 0.027
(c) With controls for new CEO
Coefficient 0.477 -0.030 0.079 -0.043 0.168 -0.030 -0.026 0.007 0.105
1-tail P-value 0.000 0.090 0.003 0.124 0.004 0.148 0.112 0.410 0.001
(d) Full panel
Coefficient 0.403 -0.016 0.073 -0.004 0.170 -0.007 -0.022 0.006 0.096
1-tail P-value 0.000 0.206 0.000 0.448 0.000 0.390 0.121 0.370 0.000
(e) Different measure of female leadership: fraction of female managers
Coefficient 2.108 -0.036 0.310 -0.114 0.789 -0.053 -0.022 -0.007 0.421
1-tail P-value 0.000 0.188 0.000 0.109 0.000 0.172 0.286 0.571 0.000
(f) Without controls for unobservable workforce and CEO ability
Coefficient 0.460 -0.035 0.072 -0.045 0.159 -0.035 -0.032 0.001 0.097
1-tail P-value 0.000 0.037 0.009 0.086 0.007 0.093 0.051 0.481 0.004
Dependent variables are in logs. Dependent variables in columns (4-9) are defined in Footnote 28.
Coefficients for a larger set of explanatory variables and standard errors are reported in Appendix
and the online appendix (Flabbi et al. (2014)). Number of observations: 2,340 (234 Firms, 10
years), all specifications except (d); specification (d): 5,029 observations (795 firms). P-values are
computed using bootstrapped standard errors with 300 replications.
22
Table 4: Impact of female leadership on moments of the firm-level male
wage distributions
Dependent
variable:
→ Standard
deviation
Average wages
Median Decile Quantiles
Below Above 1 10 1 2 3 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(a) Benchmark
Coefficient -0.107 0.021 -0.027 0.029 -0.069 0.031 0.016 0.010 -0.039
1-tail P-value 0.130 0.118 0.188 0.091 0.116 0.047 0.193 0.667 0.148
(b) All workers
Coefficient -0.113 -0.016 -0.037 -0.023 -0.071 -0.016 -0.015 -0.014 -0.047
1-tail P-value 0.095 0.894 0.080 0.919 0.078 0.901 0.870 0.183 0.076
(c) With controls for new CEO
Coefficient -0.105 0.022 -0.027 0.029 -0.067 0.031 0.016 0.010 -0.039
1-tail P-value 0.133 0.115 0.194 0.090 0.120 0.046 0.188 0.670 0.153
(d) Full panel
Coefficient -0.152 0.030 -0.038 0.058 -0.092 0.049 0.019 0.005 -0.054
1-tail P-value 0.021 0.002 0.069 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.038 0.630 0.049
(e) Different measure of female leadership: fraction of female managers
Coefficient -0.232 0.008 -0.091 -0.024 -0.203 -0.004 0.016 0.004 -0.128
1-tail P-value 0.132 0.409 0.067 0.648 0.039 0.539 0.303 0.550 0.048
(f) Without controls for unobservable workforce and CEO ability
Coefficient -0.187 0.018 -0.043 0.023 -0.104 0.026 0.013 0.007 -0.060
1-tail P-value 0.013 0.154 0.059 0.148 0.027 0.077 0.231 0.629 0.037
Dependent variables are in logs. Dependent variables in columns (4-9) are defined in Footnote 28.
Coefficients for a larger set of explanatory variables and standard errors are reported in Appendix
B and in the online appendix (Flabbi et al. (2014)). Number of observations: 2,340 (234 Firms, 10
years), all specifications except (d); specification (d): 5,029 observations (795 firms). P-values are
computed using bootstrapped standard errors with 300 replications.
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effect on the male wage variance is zero against the alternative that it is negative
is rejected in specifications (d), and (f) with p-values below 5%, and in the other
specifications with p-values close to 10%.
(ii) The effect of female leadership on wages at top of the female wage distribution
(columns 3, 5, and 9) is strongly positive and statistically significant, with p-values
of less than 1%. For example, in our benchmark specification females with wages
above the median earn on average 7.8% more when working for a female CEO than
for male CEOs (Table 3 panel (a), column (3)). The effect of female leaderships is
stronger at the right end of the wage distribution: the (highly significant) positive
impact of female leadership is 10.4% for females with wages above the 25th percentile
(column 9) and 16.7% for those earning above the 10th percentile. These results are
consistent across specifications. Symmetrically, the effect of female leadership on
wages at the bottom of the male wage distribution (Table 4, columns 2, 4, 6, and 7)
is positive and significant in most specifications.
(iii) The effect of female leadership is monotonically increasing moving from the
bottom to the top of the female wage distribution (compare the estimates of columns
2 and 3, 4 and 5, and of columns 6 through 9). The opposite holds true for the effect
on male wages. For the benchmark specification, this is illustrated in Figure 3.
(iv) The effect of female leadership at the bottom of the female wage distribution
(columns (2), (4), and (6)) is consistently negative and economically large across all
specifications, although it is less precisely estimated than the effects at the top of
the wage distribution. For example, most specifications reject the null hypothesis
that the coefficient on the bottom half of the wage distribution is zero against the
alternative that it is negative with less than 9% confidence. Specifications (b) and
(f) reject the null with a p-value below 5%. Symmetrically, the estimated effects on
male wages at the top of the male distribution are consistently negative, but in this
case they are estimated with lower precision.
(v) The estimates on the third quantile of the wage distribution (column 8 in
both tables) generally do not reject the hypothesis that the coefficients are zero.
This is again consistent with the theory, which predicts that the effects of female
leadership should be zero somewhere in the interior of the wage distribution, but
does not predict non-parametrically where the change of sign should occur.
To summarize, the signs of our point estimates of the effects of female leadership
correspond to the prediction of our theoretical model. These effects are strong and
robust across specifications. They are also strongly statistically significant when
predicted to be positive. When they are predicted to be negative, the estimates that
we obtain are close and often below conventional levels of statistical significance.
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Despite the lack of strong statistical significance at the bottom in all specifica-
tions, there are at least four factors that we believe work in favor of not rejecting
the theory. First, the sign of the point estimates is consistent across specifications.
In particular, results are robust to extending the data to include the full panel of
firms, and to including all workers (not just those that were employed at the time
the female CEO took charge of the firm). They are also not affected by excluding the
generated regressors computed in the two-way fixed-effects regression. In this case,
the point estimates are more precisely estimated even though the reported standard
errors are clustered at the firm level. The second factor that works in favor of not
rejecting the model is that the effects are generally stronger at the extremes of the
distribution, as one can observe comparing the extreme deciles to the first and fourth
quartiles. Third, the effects are increasing from the left to the right of the female
wage distribution, consistent with theory. The opposite occurs on the male wage
distribution. Finally, downward wage rigidity works against finding large negative
effects, especially at the bottom of the wage distribution therefore it is not surprising
that the estimates are more precise when the effects are positive.
4.3 Female Leadership and Firm-Level Performance
In our model, female executives improve the allocation of female talents within the
firm by counteracting pre-existing statistical discrimination. Therefore, we expect
the efficiency-enhancing effects of female leadership to be stronger the larger the
presence of female workers.
Table 5 presents the estimation results from firm performance regressions, i.e.
coefficients from estimating equation (4.1) where the dependent variable yjt is one
of the three measures of firm performance: sales per employee; value added per
employee and TFP.32 The female leadership measures and the controls are the same
as those used in the wage regressions. As in the previous subsection, our benchmark
specification focuses on the balanced panel of firms that were continuously observed
from 1988 through 1997 (panel (a) in the table). Panel (b) reports the results
from the benchmark specification run on the full (unbalanced) panel. Panel (c)
reports results using the proportion of women executives as a measure of female
leadership, and panel (d) is obtained from regressions that do not include the controls
for unobserved workforce heterogeneity and CEO ability. In Table 5 we report the
coefficients only on the variables of interest for our results. The Appendix reports
the complete set of estimated coefficients for the main explanatory variables.
32We computed TFP using the Olley and Pakes (1996) procedure: see Iranzo et al. (2008) for
the details.
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Table 5: Impacts of female leadership on firm-level performance
Dependent
variable:
→ Sales per
employee
Value added
per employee
TFP
(a) Benchmark
Female leadership 0.033 -0.120 -0.046 -0.245 -0.059 -0.213
Std. Error (0.039) (0.045) (0.038) (0.041) (0.029) (0.039)
Interaction 0.610 0.795 0.616
1-tail P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
(b) Full Panel
Female leadership 0.029 -0.009 -0.049 -0.093 -0.061 -0.096
Std. Error (0.024) (0.034) (0.026) (0.032) (0.024) (0.031)
Interaction 0.123 0.144 0.115
1-tail P-value 0.066 0.022 0.041
(c) Alternative measure of leadership: fraction of female execs.
Female leadership 0.033 -0.120 -0.046 -0.245 -0.059 -0.213
Std. Error (0.039) (0.045) (0.038) (0.041) (0.029) (0.039)
Interaction 0.610 0.795 0.616
1-tail P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
(d) Without controls for unobservable workers and CEO ability
Female leadership 0.027 -0.104 -0.064 -0.234 -0.072 -0.200
Std. Error (0.061) (0.071) (0.058) (0.057) (0.045) (0.051)
Interaction 0.523 0.677 0.513
1-tail P-value 0.001 0.000 0.002
Female leadership: Female CEO dummy (panels a, b, and c); Fraction of female executives (panel
c); Interaction: female leadership interacted with the fraction of female workers (non-executive).
Coefficients for a larger set of explanatory variables and standard errors are reported in Appendix
B and in the online appendix (Flabbi et al. (2014)).
Columns 1, 3, and 5 present specifications without interacting the female leader-
ship dummy with the share of females in the firm’s workforce, and broadly confirm
results from the literature: as found by Wolfers (2006) and Albanesi and Olivetti
(2009),33 female CEOs do not appear to have a significant impact on firm perfor-
33Recent work on the impact of gender quotas for firms’ boards have found a negative impact
on short-term profits (Ahern and Dittmar (2012), Matsa and Miller (2013)). However, first, these
papers consider the composition of boards, not executive bodies; second, it is not clear whether
the impact is due to imposing a constraint on the composition of the board or to the fact that the
added members of the boards are female.
26
mance.34 However, a change in the specification motivated by our model leads to
different results. To test if the reassignment of women is an important channel for
the impact of a female CEO on firm performance, we estimated specifications where
the measure of female leadership is interacted with the proportion of non-executive
female workers in the firm.35 Results are reported in columns 2, 4, and 6 of Table 5.
The logic from our model was that if a firm employs female workers, then a female
CEO can reassign them thereby generating gains in firm productivity. Moreover, the
more women are present at the firm, the larger the effect. The empirical prediction
is thus that the interaction term should be positive. This is exactly the result we find
for each of the three measures of firm performance. The magnitude of the impact
is substantial: for example, based on our benchmark estimates (column (2) in panel
(a) of Table 5), a female CEO taking over a firm employing the average proportion
of women in the sample would increase sales per employee by about 3.2%; if half of
the firm’s workers were women the impact would be about 18.5%.
The results are robust to adopting an alternative measure of female leadership
(the fraction of female executives reported in panel (b)) and to changing the speci-
fication to avoid using generated regressors (panel (c)). Results on the unbalanced
sample (panel (d)) report the correct sign but generate smaller point estimates and
larger standard errors: P-values for the alternative consistent with the model (a
positive sign) are in the range of 13/18%.
Overall, these results confirm Empirical prediction 2 derived from the theory.
4.4 Potential efficiency gains from gender quotas
In order to provide an order of magnitude of the potential efficiency gains generated
by increasing the presence of women in corporate leadership positions, for example
through gender quotas, we consider a partial-equilibrium exercise using as a bench-
mark the parameters reported in Table 5. We performed two counterfactuals. The
first is a “targeted” exercise where we allocated a female CEO to all firms whose
performance would improve as a result, according to our estimates from Section 4.3
(i.e., firms with at least 20 percent of female employees). This results in 51% of firms
with a woman CEO. In our second counterfactual, instead, we assign a female CEO
to the same proportion of firms (51%) selected randomly.
We computed the predicted value of the dependent variable under the two sce-
narios. Results are in Table 6. When Female CEOs are allocated randomly, the
34The only exception is TFP reporting a marginally significant negative impact.
35Just as in the wage regressions, we only focus on non-executives because the theory presented
in Section 2 is not modeling promotion to executive, executive pay or interaction within executives.
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Table 6: Impact of gender quotas
Counterfactual Average percent gain Percent gain for treated
Sales Value added TFP Sales Value added TFP
CEO Allocation Quota
Random 51% 1.9 -2.1 -2.7 3.7 -4.1 -5.4
Female share > 20% 51% 6.7 4.2 2.1 14.2 8.7 4.3
Note: average percent gains relative to fitted data. “Treated” firms are firms that acquire a female
CEO.
average percent change is generally small, and its sign depends on the measure of
performance. In contrast, our “targeted” exercise delivers large, positive effects in
the firms that are assigned a female CEO, and also positive effects overall. For ex-
ample, the table shows that in this scenario sales per worker would increase by 14%
in the “treated” firms and by 6.7% in the overall sample of firms. This is because our
findings imply large, positive interaction effects between female leadership and the
share of female workers. Although our exercises ignore general equilibrium effects,
these results confirm that, based on our estimates, the order of magnitude of the
efficiency gains from having a larger female representation in firm leadership can be
quite large.36
5 Other explanations
In this section, we discuss the plausibility of possible alternative explanations for the
empirical results we presented in Section 4.
5.1 Gender preferences
A possible alternative explanation for our results is that female CEOs give preferen-
tial treatment to female workers. However, such an explanation is at odds with at
lest two of our findings. First, the effect of female leadership on female wages varies
with the wage level, so much so that the impact at lower wages is negative. A theory
based on preferences would require the ad-hoc assumption that the CEOs preferences
for women are conditional on their wage level. In particular, a female CEO would
need to prefer female workers at the top of the distribution, and to hold prejudice
36The effect on the average gender wage gap, not shown in the table, is small. In firms acquir-
ing female leadership, the higher wages of female workers at the high end of the distribution are
compensated by lower wages at the low end of the wage distribution.
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against women at the bottom of the distribution. Second, preferential treatment is
inconsistent with our results on firm performance illustrated in Subsection 4.3. If
female CEOs gave preferential treatment to female workers, they would be prone
to hire and promote female workers even if males with identical characteristics were
more productive. As a result, the impact on performance of the interaction between
female leadership and share of females would unlikely be positive.37
5.2 Complementarities between female managers and skilled
female workers
Complementarities between female managers and skilled labor input from female
workers may be consistent with some of our results depending on the source of such
complementarities. For example, one could assume that communication is more ef-
ficient between workers and executives of the same gender. This communication
technology is not in contradiction with our model. In fact, it provides a possible
micro-foundation for the crucial assumption of our statistical discrimination frame-
work: the difference in the quality of signals from workers of different gender.
However, similar effects could be also derived from a complete information model
where communication skills enter directly into the production function. For example,
complementarities may be generated by peer-group effects or because female man-
agers are role models for skilled female workers.38 These explanations can indeed
generate the productivity effects we find in our results. They can also generate one
result from the wage regressions: the positive effect of female leadership on female
wages at the top of the distribution. However, these alternative explanations are
unable to generate the two other results we obtain from the wage regressions: the
negative effect of female leadership on female wages at the bottom of the distribu-
tion, and any effect of female leadership on the male wage distribution. We conclude
that the balance of the evidence favors our statistical discrimination model.
6 Conclusion
Motivated by a recent literature showing the importance of executives’ personal
traits in determining firm policies and outcomes, and by the traditional literature
on gender differentials in the labor market, we investigate whether female executives
make a difference on gender-specific wage distributions and on firm performance. We
37Bednar and Gicheva (2014) find support for a similar conclusion. Using a matched manager-
firm data with information about the gender composition in lower levels of the job ladder, and they
do not find evidence that gender is predictive of a supervisor’s female-friendliness.
38Athey et al. (2000) introduce a model analyzing the effects of mentoring on workplace diversity.
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find that female CEOs increase the variance of women’s wages at the firm because
they have a positive impact on wages at the top of the distribution, and a (smaller)
negative impact on wages at the bottom. In our preferred specification, female CEOs
increase wages for women in the top 25% of the women’s wage distribution by about
10 percentage points and they decrease wages for women in the bottom 25% by about
3 percentage points. The impact on the men’s wage distribution has opposite signs.
Our results are robust to alternative measures of female leadership, to different em-
pirical specifications and to different sample selection criteria for firms and workers.
When looking at the impact on firm performance, we estimate that the interaction
between female CEOs and the share of female workers employed at the firm has a
positive impact on firm performance. The magnitude of the impact is substantial:
in our preferred specification, a female CEO taking over a firm employing the av-
erage proportion of women in the sample would increase overall sales per employee
by about 3.7%. The results are robust to three different measures of firm produc-
tivity, one different measure of female leadership, and two different specifications
and estimation samples. Moreover, we exploited the matched employer-employee,
longitudinal structure of our data to construct a rich set of controls for firm-level,
workforce-level, and executive-level heterogeneity, thereby alleviating selection bias
concerns.
This evidence is consistent with a model of statistical discrimination where female
executives are better equipped at interpreting signals of productivity from female
workers. As a result of this attenuated information asymmetry, female CEOs taking
charge of previously male-led firms are able to reverse statistical discrimination,
paying women wages that are closer to their actual productivity and matching them
to jobs that are more in line with their skills.
The interpretation of our results through the implications of our theoretical model
suggests that there are potentially high costs associated with the underrepresentation
of women at the top of corporate hierarchies. Our findings suggest that companies
with a substantial female presence would be likely to benefit from assigning women
to leadership positions. Results from a partial-equilibrium counterfactual experi-
ment based on our point estimates show if all the firms with at least 20% of female
workers were lead by female CEOs, they would see their sales per worker increase
by about 14.2%. From a public policy point of view, the same partial-equilibrium
counterfactual experiment shows that an integrated generalized extension of women
in leadership positions would lead to a much smaller,39 but still positive effect on
393.7% instead of 14.2%, see Table 6. Results on Value Added and TFP would actually turn from
positive to negative, with magnitudes always smaller than in the sales per worker case.
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sales per worker.
A Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Define ŝ as the signal satisfying Ψm(q|ŝ) = Ψf (q|ŝ), which exists and is unique
because of a “single-crossing” property of the Normal distribution’s cdf.40 Note that
the schedules defining productivity of male and female workers in the complex job
(top equation in 2.2) cross at the same signal, ŝ, as the schedules defining marginal
product in the simple job (bottom equation in 2.2). In particular, we must have
1− 2Φm(q|s) < 1− 2Φf (q|s) for all s < ŝ (A.1)
1− 2Φf (q|s) < 1− 2Φm(q|s) for all s > ŝ
because under the assumption on the signals’ noise σf > σm, Ψm has thinner tails
than Ψf .
Observe also from the wage equation that either s ≤ min{sm, sf}, or s ≥
max{sm, sf}. To prove it, note that by definition of sg, Ψm(q|sm) = (q|sf ) = 1/2,
therefore Ψm(q|s) > 1/2 > Ψf (q|s) for all s ∈ (sm, sf ), hence the crossing of the dis-
tributions must occur outside of this range, that is where either (i) Ψg(q|s) > 1/2, g =
m, f , or (ii) Ψg(q|s) < 1/2, g = m, f . Case (i) is displayed in Figure 1. In case (i)
both male and female workers with signal s ≤ ŝ are employed in the simple task, and
w(s;σm) < w(s;σf ) holds because of (A.1). But then it must also be the case that
sm < sf .
41 For sm < s < sf , we have male workers employed in the complex task
and female workers employed in the simple job. Because Ψm(q|s) < 1/2 < Ψf (q|s),
we have l (1− 2Φf (q|s)) < h (1− 2Φm(q|s)) hence w(s;σm) > w(s;σf ). For s ≥ sf
all workers are employed in the complex task and since the crossing of Ψmand Ψf
occurred at s < sf , we must have w(s;σm) > w(s;σf ). Case (ii) can be proved sym-
metrically, by observing that both male and female workers with s ≥ ŝ are employed
in the complex task and receive wages w(s;σm) > w(s;σf ). In this case, it must
be the case that sf < sm, and wages below sm must satisfy w(s;σm) < w(s;σf ) by
40Consider two normal distributions F,G with different variance (σF > σG). Then, regardless
their mean, there exists a unique x : F (x) > G(x) for all x < x, and F (x) < G(x) for all x > x.
To prove this single crossing property, denote with f, g the densities of distributions F,G. Because
f, g are symmetric around their respective means, and σF > σG, the two densities intersect at
points x1, x2 with f(x) > g(x) if x < x1 or x < x2, and f(x) < g(x) for x1 < x < x2. But then
F (x) > G(x) for all x < x1 and 1 − F (x) > 1 − G(x), or F (x) < G(x) for x > x2. Hence any
intersection between F and G must occur between x1 and x2, but in this range f(x) > g(x), that is,
F (x) has derivative greater than the derivative of G(x), therefore there can be only one intersection.
41Case (i) holds whenever q > µ, that is whenever employers without signals would place workers
in the simple job, hence a more precise signal implies more workers in the complex job.
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an argument similar to that made for case (i).
B Appendix: additional results on the benchmark
specification.
We report below the estimation results for the benchmark specification. Results
for all robustness specifications are available in the online appendix (Flabbi et al.
(2014)).
All the reported standard errors are computed by a bootstrapping procedure. We
need to compute standard errors by bootstrapping on specifications (a)-(e) because
they include generated regressors (the CEO and worker fixed effects) from the first
stage. Standard errors in the first stage can be computed only by bootstrap (AKM.)
We perform the bootstrapping procedure by resampling at the firm level and by
resampling separately firms that never had a female CEO and firms that had a
female CEO at least once. This procedure is meant to produce standard errors that
are clustered at firm level and stratified by female CEO dummy. Since stratification
at the first stage may generate samples with zero or very few firms with female
CEOs at the second stage, identification of the parameters of interest may not be
attained for some bootstrap runs. Therefore, we computed standard errors using
only bootstraps with more than 10 firms with a female CEO in the second stage.
We run the procedure until we reach 300 valid replications.
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Table A.3: Estimates on Firm-Level Performance, benchmark specification
Dependent
variable
→ Sales per
employee
Value added
per employee
TFP
. variable ↓ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female CEO 0.033 -0.120 -0.046 -0.245 -0.059 -0.213
(0.039) (0.045) (0.038) (0.041) (0.029) (0.039)
Interaction 0.610 0.795 0.616
(0.142) (0.169) (0.172)
CEO age 0.212 0.209 0.442 0.438 0.320 0.316
(0.154) (0.152) (0.162) (0.160) (0.146) (0.145)
CEO tenure -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CEO started <1980 0.028 0.028 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.010
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
CEO fixed eff. 0.017 0.017 0.065 0.064 0.046 0.045
(0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Avg. Wkr. age 0.028 0.031 0.051 0.055 0.055 0.058
(0.027) (0.028) (0.031) (0.033) (0.029) (0.029)
Avg wkr. tenure 0.005 0.004 -0.013 -0.014 -0.030 -0.030
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
% white collars 0.269 0.254 -0.117 -0.137 -0.082 -0.098
(0.135) (0.136) (0.154) (0.155) (0.154) (0.154)
Fraction female -0.313 -0.390 -0.496 -0.596 -0.478 -0.556
(0.234) (0.242) (0.157) (0.158) (0.164) (0.161)
Avg. wkr. F.E. 1.217 1.284 1.636 1.724 1.438 1.506
(0.267) (0.264) (0.299) (0.305) (0.305) (0.299)
Constant 3.089 3.020 2.072 1.983 0.422 0.353
(0.640) (0.653) (0.830) (0.868) (0.697) (0.708)
R2: Between 0.590 0.592 0.218 0.222 0.179 0.182
Within 0.013 0.015 0.044 0.055 0.270 0.268
Overall 0.070 0.073 0.070 0.081 0.248 0.247
Dependent variables are in logs. Boostrap Standard Errors in parentheses; see text for details.
Additional controls: 15 region dummies, 20 industry dummies, 4 firm-size dummies, year dummies,
industry-specific trends, and firm fixed effects.
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